MOMBAI, A DISRUPÇÃO ISLÂMICA


Se é verdade que a Índia é um melting pot religioso
e um campo de tensão competitiva a esse nível, temos que historicamente
os bons exemplos de respeito e convivência pacífica são mais abundantes
na maior parte do tempo que os de conflitos integristas e radicais
sobretudo entre muçulmanos e hindus e, mais recentemente, de hindus sobre cristãos,
e entre as demais manifestações do religioso.
lkj
Este caso em Mombai tem contornos mais graves e mais sérios
relativamente ao passado recente local,
onde, por exemplo, o integrismo hindu fora reprimido com eficácia,
e é todo um novo enunciado de predisposição homicida,
dada a extrema e meticulosa organização evidenciada.
Com pouca margem de erro, respeita ao modus operandi dos sequazes da Al Qaeda,
com objectivos nítidos: transferir para territórios novos as suas tácitcas
de desrupção até agora praticadas, mas em processo de contenção, noutros,
como o Iraque e o Afeganistão/Paquistão, sobretudo.
As célebres tácticas dos norte-americanos
no Iraque, com o General Petraeus, estabelecem princípios de acção
que funcionam entre a negociação comunitária e o contra-terror
e em muito explicam a transmigração sonante de muitas células de voluntários
internacionais da Al Qaeda, cada vez mais frustrados no propósito
de humilhar sucessivamente os norte-americanos.
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HEADQUARTERS
Multi-National Force — Iraq Baghdad,
Iraq APO AE 09342-1400
10 May 2007
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Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen
serving in Multi-National Force — Iraq: Our values and the laws governing warfare
teach us to respect human dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right.
Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy.
This fight depends on securing the population,
which must understand that we — not our enemies — occupy the moral high ground.
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This strategy has shown results in recent months. Al Qaeda’s indiscriminate attacks,
for example, have finally started to turn a substantial portion of the Iraqi population against it.
In view of this, I was concerned by the results of a recently released survey conducted last fall
in Iraq that revealed an apparent unwillingness on the part of some US personnel
to report illegal actions taken by fellow members of their units.
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The study also indicated that a small percentage of those surveyed
may have mistreated noncombatants. This survey should spur reflection on our conduct in combat.
I fully appreciate the emotions that one experiences in Iraq. I also know firsthand
the bonds between members of the “brotherhood of the close fight.”
Seeing a fellow trooper killed by a barbaric enemy can spark frustration,
anger, and a desire for immediate revenge. As hard as it might be,
however, we must not let these emotions lead us — or our comrades in arms — to commit hasty,
illegal actions. In the event that we witness or hear of such actions,
we must not let our bonds prevent us from speaking up.
lkj
Some may argue that we would be more effective if we sanctioned torture
or other expedient methods to obtain information from the enemy.
They would be wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal,
history shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor necessary.
Certainly, extreme physical action can make someone “talk”; however,
what the individual says may be of questionable value.
In fact our experience in applying the interrogation standards laid out in the Army Field Manual (2-22.3)
on Human Intelligence Collector Operations that was published last year
shows that the techniques in the manual work effectively and humanely
in eliciting information from detainees.
lkj
We are, indeed, warriors. We train to kill our enemies. We are engaged in combat,
we must pursue the enemy relentlessly, and we must be violent at times.
What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight, however,
is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards
and values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and respect.
While we are warriors, we are also all human beings. Stress caused by lengthy deployments
and combat is not a sign of weakness; it is a sign that we are human.
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If you feel such stress, do not hesitate to talk to your chain of command,
your chaplain, or a medical expert. We should use the survey results to renew our commitment
to the values and standards that make us who we are and to spur re-examination of these issues.
Leaders, in particular, need to discuss these issues with their troopers — and, as always,
they need to set the right example and strive to ensure proper conduct.
We should never underestimate the importance of good leadership and the difference it can make.
Thanks for what you continue to do. It is an honor to serve with each of you.
kjh
David H. Petraeus General,
United States Army Commanding

Comments

antonio ganhão said…
Olha trouxeste para aqui o meu Petrauss...
Tiago R Cardoso said…
um vergonha.

ouvi algures que estes comandos não eram bem do Bin landen, eram grupos autónomos onde a Al-Qaeda era fonte de inspiração.
joshua said…
Tiago, a Al Qaeda é a Base e funciona por núcleos herméticos, como uma hidra cujas cabeças, cortadas uma a uma, permitem que o corpo vá subsistindo e novas cabeças vão ressurgindo.

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